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Passport Denial As A Security Measure
This Note considers the constitutionality of passport denials
based exclusively on the applicant's past or present beliefs
and associations. After weighing the interests in favor of free
travel against the protection afforded national security by
these denials, the author concludes that they are unconstitu-
tional.
Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home
is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pre-
tended, from abroad.
Madison to Jefferson, 1798.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles' has recently dc-
cided that the Passport Regulations 2 of the State Department are
invalid insofar as the regulations authorize the State Department to
deny passports to citizens of the United States who refuse to file
noncommunist affidavits.3 The rationale of this decision is that Con-
gress has not authorized 4 passport denial based on an applicant's
beliefs or associations. By basing its decision on the lack of con-
gressional authorization, the Court avoided deciding the cons'Wtu-
tionality of passport denial under the regulations' provisions, ' and
since legislation has already been proposed to give the State De-
partment the authorization which the Supreme Court found lack-
ing,6 the passports problem will probably remain in heated, but
1. 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (5-4 decision). The Court also recently decided that basing
passport denial on confidential information regarding a person's beliefs and associations
is invalid, for the same reason as in Kent. Dayton v. Dulles, 857 U.S. 144 (1958) (5-,4
decision). The issue of confidential information is, however, beyond the scope of this
Note.
2. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.101-.170 (Supp. 1958).
3. 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (Supp. 1958). This section provides in general that in order
to prevent the use of passports to further the purposes of the communist movement,
passports would not be issued to: a) present members of the Communist Party or those
who had recently terminated their membership under circumstances leading to the con-
clusion that they continue to act in the furtherance of the aims of the Communist Party,
b) persons whose activities in support of the communist movement indicated that they
were being directed and controlled by the Communist Party, c) persons whose purposes
in going abroad were to knowingly advance the purposes of the Communist Party.
For the section of the Regulations requiring a noncommunist aflidavit, see 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.142 (Supp. 1958).
4. The State Department had found authorization for the regulations in congressional
and executive action: Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C.
§ 211 (a) (1952); 22 C.F.R. § 51.75,.77 (Supp. 1958).
5. 357 U.S. at 129.
6. See S. 4110, H.R. 13318, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958). Congress adjourned without
passing the proposed passport legislation this year, however.
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unresolved, conflict for the next several years. Only an eventual
holding or series of holdings by the Supreme Court on the basic
issues of the constitutionality of passport denials based on the citi-
zen-applicant's beliefs or associations will resolve the present con-
flict on a lasting, sound basis. This Note will discuss and analyze
the practical considerations for and against passport denial based
on beliefs and associations in an attempt to determine the constitu-
tionality of such denial.
II. PASSPORTS POLICY OF THE STATE DEPARTmENTr
Since early American history, the State Department has, in its
discretion, denied passports to some American citizens.- Prior to the
early 1940's, however, there was little concern expressed over the
denials, because until then passports were not necessary for travel
abroad,8 and because the Department issued a passport to any citi-
zen unless he was fleeing justice, immoral, or negligent in following
required application procedures. However, shortly after passports
became a prerequisite to travel overseas, the State Department in-
stituted the policy of frequently denying passports on the ground
that the applicant's proposed travels would be contrary to the "best
interests of the United States." 10 Shortly after Bauer v. Acheson,"1
wlih held that an applicant must be given notice and hearing of
pending denial, the Department, in 1952, promulgated the regula-
tions which were held invalid in Kent. These regulations required
that an applicant be given such notice and hearing and, also, re-
quired that in case of denial an applicant should have the right to
appeal his case before the State Department Board of Passport
Appeals.' In addition to these procedural protections, the regula-
tions set forth broad substantive standards providing for denial
when the Department determined a) the applicant was a commu-
nist, b) the applicant was a communist affiliate or communist ad-
7. See O'Connor, The State Department Defends, Saturday Rev., Jan. 11, 1958,
p. 11; 3 HACxWORTH, DIGcsT OF INTER.NATiONAL LAW 498 (1942). See note 4 supra.
8. Passports had previously been required for short periods when the United States
was at war, but not until 1941 were they required for departure from the United States
during every national emergency (the United States has been in a state of national
emergency ever since 1941). See Comment, 61 YAI. L.J. 171, 172 n.6 (1952). It is
likely that the United States will remain in a state of emergency for quite sonc time.
But even if it does not, so that passports would no longerbe required for departure,
passport denial would still result in travel control because most foreign countries require
aliens attempting to enter to have passports. Id. at 171 n.3.
9. See 3 HAcxwoRTE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 498-512.
10. See Note, "Passport Denied" State Department Practice and Due Process, 3
STAN. L. REv. 312 (1951); Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitu-
tional Issues and Judicil Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952).
11. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
12. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.101-.170 (Supp. 1958).
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vocate, or c) that the applicant's travels were intended to promote
communism.13 Since passports had become necessary for travel
abroad, and since there were frequent denials under the regula-
tions, the validity of the regulations began to meet challenge in the
courts.
III. Pn~vious Lowxmi COUIT DECISIONS
In the last decade several cases have been decided by lower fed-
eral courts which involved questions of the constitutionality of
denials under the State Department Passport Regulations.' 4 The
earlier of these cases 1' ruled that if a passport applicant had not
been given adequate notice and hearing, or if the denial of his pass-
port was arbitrary, the denial would be invalid. These cases re-
mained the only law on the subject until 1955, either because they
were not appealed or, if appealed, because the State Department
mooted the issue by granting the applicant's passport.'0 By the time
the passport was issued, however, the applicants need for it had
usually passed and thus the issuance of the passport was no victory
for the applicant.
Schachtman v. Dulles, '1 decided in 1955, held that passport de-
nial must conform to the requirements of substantive due process of
law. The court, expanding on this holding, said variously that there
must be a reasonable relation between the denial and the conduct
of foreign affairs, and that the right to travel could be impinged
only by reasonable regulation under law. However, althiough
Schachtman was significant because it held that passport denial
must conform to the requirements of substantive due process, and
for the first time held that United States citizens have a constitu-
tional right to travel, it failed to go further and decide the constitu-
tional validity of the regulations themselves, that is of passport
denial -under the regulations. None of the cases which had touched
on questions of constitutionality had considered that every pass-
port denial under the regulations might have been an unconstitu-
tional denial of liberty without due process; they had only consid-
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub norn. Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd, 357 U.S.
144 (1958); Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Schaehtman v. Dulles,
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See cases cited notes 15 & 16 infra. See also Kraus v.
Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (involving indigence as grounds for passport
denial).
15. E.g., Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955); Clark v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
16. See, e.g., Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See Doman, A Corn-
parative Analysis: Do Citizens Have the Right to Travel?, 43 A.B.A.J. 307, 309 (1957);
see also Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 CoLUm. L. REv. 47, 59 (1956).
17. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 40 MwN. L. Rxv. 709 (1956).
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ered whether, within the standards of the regulations, particular de-
nials were arbitrary or unreasonable.1 8
In 1957, however, the court of appeals in Briehl v. Dulles,' did
decide the validity of the regulations themselves. Holding the regu-
lations valid, the court said the proper test was to balance the in-
terests involved: the public interest in protecting national safety and
security and in preventing diplomatic indiscretions abroad, against
the citizen's interest in free travel.20 The court's use of the balance
of interests test was a good approach toward solving the problem
of constitutionality of passport denial based on beliefs and associ-
ations; however, the court's balancing of the interests involved was
inadequate. Stripped of excess verbiage, the reasoning which led
the court to the conclusion that the regulations were valid is the fol-
lowing: that on balance, in this troubled hour of history with the
world on the brink of a disastrous war, the public interest in pro-
tecting national security and preventing international diplomatic
incidents outweighs the individual's interest in traveling abroad.
The trouble with such reasoning is that the court failed to consider
whether free travel actually endangers national security, and, if it
does, whether passport denial abates that danger. Few people will
dispute the fact that national security is of the utmost importance
and outweighs the individual's interest in free travel, but if free
travel has little or no effect on national security, there is no justifica-
tion for restricting such travel (unless free travel is so insignificant
a right that it makes little difference how it is treated). To arrive
at the opposite conclusion would be as nonsensical as closing golf
courses because national security is more important than playing
golf.
In order to make a more adequate balance than that made by the
court of appeals in Briehl, the constitutional nature of the right to
travel and the relevance of the tests required by the constitutional
provisions involved should be examined.
IV. TBE CONSTrTUTION AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Nature of the right to travel
Although courts which have been confronted with cases involving
constitutionality of passport denial have held, either expressly or by
implication, that there is a constitutionally protected right to
18. Extensive quotations from cases to this effect may be found in Boudin, supra
note 16, at 56-58.
19. 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), redd sub no. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116(1958).
20. 248 F.2d at 573.
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travel,21 they have not clearly defined the nature of that right. The
Supreme Court in the recent Kent decision expressed the strong and
unequivocal dictum that "the right to travel is a part of the liberty'
of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law
under the fifth amendment. 22 The lower courts had also considered
travel to come within the scope of 'liberty,"23 and with the excep-
tion of one case had limited themselves to consideration of only the
fifth amendment. The court of appeals in Briehi, however, indicated
that first amendment rights may be involved in passport denials."
Some scholars, likening the right to free travel to other rights such
as "to speak, to write, to use the mails, to publish, to assemble, to
petition," 2 have gone further than Briehl, saying that travel itself,
like these other rights, is a first amendment "freedom of expression."
Though this approach is plausible, it is not clear that a court would
construe the specific guarantees of the first amendment ("freedom of
speech" and "of the press, . . ' the right . . . peaceably to as-
semble" and "to petition") to be merely examples of a broad cate-
gory called "freedom of expression"-a category, protected by the
first amendment, which would include free travel as well. Certainly
the argument for including travel among the fifth amendment "lib-
erties" is much stronger than for including travel within the protec-
tion of the first amendment, since the term 'liberty" is given mean-
ing and content by judges. The judges, including those of the Su-
preme Court, who have considered the nature of the right to travel
have found it to be a fifth amendment "liberty."
Others have said that the right to travel is indirectly a first amend-
ment right on the grounds that when an applicant is denied the right
to travel he is denied the right to free speech in foreign countries,
the premise being that free speech is a right exercisable anywhere.20
Assuming the constitutional freedom of speech to apply beyond the
continental limits of the United States, 21 a free speech problem
would be involved, certainly, to the extent that the Department de-
21. See text after note 17 indicating that Schachtman was the first case to expressly
pass on the question of the constitutionality of the right to travel, whereas prior cases
had just assumed the constitutional nature of this "right."
22. 857 U.S. at 125.
23. See, e.g., Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 40 MNN.
L. RLv. 709 (1956).
24. 148 F.2d at 573. See also dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon, Id. at 585-86.
25. Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1952, pp. 66, 68.
26. See, e.g., Boudin, supra note 16, at 50; Comment, The Passport Puzzle, 23 U.
Cm. L. RF-v. 260, 268, 288-89 (1956).
27. The Supreme Court once said, "The Constitution can have no operation in another
country." In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (dictum). Probably the biggest stop
away from this decision was in Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951), where the court said that "the protection of the
Fourth Amendment extends to United States citizens in foreign countries under occu-
pation by our armed forces." 184 F.2d at 138. It is not clear that the Supreme Court
[Vol. 43:126
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nies a passport for the express purpose of prohibiting the applicant
from speaking abroad. To say that free speech is "a right exercis-
able anywhere," however, is to ignore the fact that though a person
may have a right to speak, this right does not entitle him to go any-
where he may wish to speak if there are reasons for barring his
presence other than just a desire to prevent his speaking. "
Passport denial may also abate first amendment rights by indi-
rectly punishing an applicant for his past free speech and association
in the United States. Since past behaviour is used as evidence of
probable behaviour abroad, perfectly legal left-wing association in
the past may result in denial of a passport.
In summary, this writer concludes 1) with respect to the fifth
amendment, that free travel is in itself included in that amendment
as a "liberty" which cannot be denied to a person without due
process of law, and 2) with respect to the first amendment, that free
travel is not included within the guarantees of that amendment but
is indirectly connected to the extent that the denial of free travel
results in the denial of free speech. However, since both first and
fifth amendment rights may be impinged by passport denial, though
not necessarily both in the same case,30 a proper test of constitu-
tionality of denial should consider both first and fifth amendment
requirements.
would maintain its 1891 position with respect to citizens not connected with armed
forces, either, especially in view of the strong dictum in Kent to the effect that the right
to travel is within the scope of fifth amendment "liberty." See generally Comment, The
Constitution Abroad: The Operation of the Constitution Beyond the Continental Limits
of the United States, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 58 (1953). Upon an evaluation of the extent of
travel in 1958 as compared with that of 1891, and the much larger scale of necessary
travel (business and education as opposed to just pleasure) today, this writer concludes
with regard to actions of our Government, that American citizens should be granted
constitutional protection throughout the world. The same conclusion has been reached
by others:
The restrictive policy exemplified by the Ross case, which probably originated
in the political ideologies of the 'Monroe Era,' is outmoded in a day when few
Americans pass a lifetime without traveling beyond the continental boundaries
of the United States.
Id. at 77.
28. This type of action by the government has been likened to the previous restraint
involved in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Comment, supra note 10, at
193-94. An illustration of this type may be the case of Judge Clark. Clark v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955). Clark was denied a passport to prohibit his speaking in
Germany against our military occupation government in that country. It may be that
the government would have its strongest case in a situation such as this where our gov-
ernment is in military occupation of a country, and someone proposes to go over there
to speak against occupation.
29. For example, the right to freedom of speech obviously does not give a citizen the
right to go to the center of an atomic laboratory at Oak Ridge to make a speech.
30. Since "liberty" within the fifth amendment would be involved in ecenj case, both
first and fifth amendment rights will be involved except where there is no encroachment
on freedom of speech.
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The right to travel and the fifth amendment
In determining the constitutionality of an abridgment of a fifth
amendment right, the Supreme Court has said:
The Fifth Amendment . . . do[es] not prohibit governmental regulation
for the public welfare. [It] merely condition[s] the exertion of the ad-
mitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods
consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained. . . . [T]he reasonableness of
each regulation depends upon the relevant facts.3'
In order to determine the "reasonableness" of the regulation the
court must "[balance] private right against public requirement." 2
When balancing these interests in a passport denial case, the court
must therefore consider both the importance of the right of free
travel, and the effectiveness of passport denial as a means of protect-
ing national security.
(1) Importance of free travel. To the individual who wishes to
travel abroad, the right to free travel is important for a number of
reasons. First, to the businessman, the newsman, or the professional
man going abroad on business, the right to travel is a property right
of great practical importance, since it is necessary for his economic
welfare.33 To the person such as Dr. Briehl3 4 whose purpose in going
abroad is the furtherance of his education by either attending a
conference or attending a foreign university, free travel is also a
property right, at least to the extent that education increases a per-
son's earning power and leads to a better economic or social position
in the United States.
To a man such as Judge Clark whose avowed purpose in going
abroad is to criticize United States foreign policy, the right to travel
is important primarily as a right to free speech. To him the right to
travel is important in the same manner as is the right to free speech
to a minority group such as the Jehovah's Witnesses. To the vaca-
tioning pleasure seeker, or the honeymooner, or the visitor with
relatives residing abroad, the right to travel is primarily important
31. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). (Emphasis added.) Although
this case involved issues of economic due process, it was decided before the Supreme
Court had adopted the more recent rational connection test for economic due process
cases. See Carolene Products v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944). Nebbia has been
cited frequently for a statement of the post-1937 test for noneconomic duo process
cases. See, e.g., Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
32. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
33. See, e.g., Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) (reporter); cf.,
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (interstate migratory workers).
34. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Dr. Briehl sought a passport
in order to attend an international psychoanalytic congress in Geneva.
35. Clark v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955).
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as part of the traditional American liberty to do within reasonable
limits what he pleases when he pleases.
Free travel is important to the nation as a collective group as well
as to the individual There is little question that the United States
receives considerable economic benefit from the travels of the busi-
nessman, since he is directly engaged in bringing foreign trade to
the United States and observing foreign methods that can be used
in this country. The nation also derives indirect economic benefits
from the travel of the person who goes abroad for educational pur-
poses, since assumedly that person will increase his skill and thereby
contribute more to the efficiency of the economy.
Politically, free travel is also important to the nation. As some
scholars have pointed out,38 by restricting citizens' free travel the
United States is fighting communism with totalitarian methods, thus
giving the appearance to the rest of the world that democracy works
only until it is challenged by a totalitarian government; that by
fighting communists with their own methods of suppression, the
United States gives added stature to the effectiveness of those meth-
ods, and awakens a cynical attitude toward America's sincerity in
her democratic ideals of freedom and equality. Russia appears hon-
est by comparison because of her open adherence to totalitarianism.
As Henry Steele Commager has said:
Does it ever occur to officials in the State Deartment that it might in fact
be "in the best interests of the United States to ermit -nay encourage
-criticism? Europeans are weary of official spokesmen who always de-
fend government policy, and have learned to discount it. What really wins
their interest is the spectacle of a nation permitting the utmost freedom of
discussion and of criticism.
It is not in the best interest of the United States to confess to the world
that we are afraid of what our own Veople may say about us, or to confess
that we are so sensitive that we cant stand criticism or unfriendly discus-
sion and that we seek to silence such discussion.37
Or as President Eisenhower said, one of the United States' objec-
tives is "to lower the barriers which now impede the opportunities
of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly pur-
poses, so that all will have a chance to know each other face-to-
face." 38
36. See Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUML L. REv. 47 (1956);
Marx, Effects of International Tension on Liberty Under Law, 48 COLUM. L. RME. 555
(1948); O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 HAIv. L. RBv. 1
(1952); Welch, What's Wrong With U.S. Passport Polict?, Saturday Rev., Jan. 11,
1958, p. 10; Note, 27 IND. L.J. 550 (1952); but cf. Sutherland, Freedom and Internal
Security, 64 HAv. L. REv. 383 (1951).
37. Commager, A Nation of Travelers, Saturday Rev., Jan. 11, 1958, p. 24, at 69-70.
38. N.Y. Times, July 23,1955, § 1, p. 2, col. 4. Despite this statement, however, Presi-
dent Eisenhower is in favor of travel control through passport deniaL
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Another scholar has said that from a purely practical standpoint
free travel is essential to the nation because it facilitates keeping a
first-hand working knowledge of the events occuring in foreign
countries.39
When it is considered that over half a million people each year
apply for passports for one or more of the above reasons,"0 it can be
seen that the right to travel freely is important enough to the indi-
vidual and to the nation that it should not be abrogated without a
well considered determination that the national security can be pro-
tected by such abrogation.
(2) Effectiveness of passport denial. The State Department's posi-
tion is that in order to protect national security, passports should be
denied to persons who would use them to further international com-
munism in an attempt to eventually accomplish the overthrow of the
United States government.41 In order to prevent these persons from
leaving the United States, it has been necessary to deny passports to
applicants whose activities have indicated communist sympathies,
since the largest number of active subversives would be found in
that group. The theoretical justification for the unavoidable denial
of some legitimate passport applications under this system is that
protection of national security by this means outweighs the harm
done by denying passports to nonsubversives. However, since pro-
fessional spies would be too clever to blatantly display any un-
American activities in their personal lives, the premise that most
subversives would be prevented from leaving the United States by
passport denials based primarily on an applicant's past activities"
is of doubtful validity. In most cases only propagandists and honest
left-wing "radicals" would be denied passports. But the government
has no valid interest that would be protected from these effective
denials, because permitting criticism of our government in foreign
countries would in most cases achieve more good than suppressing
criticism.43
Further, even when actual subversives are denied passports, there
are good arguments44 that such passport denial cannot be effective
to stop the work of these subversive agents; that passport denial is
39. Welch, supra note 36, at 66.
40. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT OF TIE UNITED STATES:
1957, at 100.
41. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 7, passim; but see AcIIESON, A DE.MOCAT LOOKS
AT His PARTY, 127 (1955).
42. See note 3supra.
43. See text at notes 36 & 37 supra. Probably the government can be validly criticized
for having failed to even attempt designating the various interests it has been trying to
protect. Apparently, little distinction was to be placed between a person going overseas
to commit espionage, subversion or merely to propagandise.
44. See, e.g., Welch, supra note 36, at 10; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 197 (1952).
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a mere inconvenience to them. First, there are many other ways for
an agent to get abroad, as by way of Mexico or Canada, or by off-
shore submarine. Second, with today's efficient communications
methods such as mail, telephone, cable and short wave radio, a
message can easily be relayed to the Kremlin without the necessity
of an agent's traveling abroad. 5
Since passport denial is an ineffective method of protecting the
nation from the harmful activities of subversive agents residing in
the United States, the writer concludes that it is an unreasonable
abridgment of the citizen's constitutionally protected right to travel
under the fifth amendment.
The right to travel and the first amendment
The test for constitutionality under the first amendment has been
whether the speech or "words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent"4 6 Under this rule only serious harm to an important
national interest can be abated.47 In dealing with the communists,
however, the Supreme Court has in recent years modified the clear
and present danger test, stating that a requirement of clear and
present danger would bar effective action against the long-term
communist movement.48 The modified test, first expressed in Dennis
v. United States,4 9 has been whether ". . . the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger."o The Dennis test, some schol-
ars have said, has replaced the clear and present danger test.51
However, whichever of the two tests the Supreme Court may
apply in the future, both the clear and present danger and the
Dennis tests are more stringent than the fifth amendment "reason-
45. See Briehi v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
With existing two day delivery time for mail between the United States and, London
or Paris in large volume, it is doubtful that there is much time for any governmental
agency to check for coded messages and, consequently, little risk to the sender or re-
ceiver.
46. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918). (Emphasis added.) Accord,
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
47. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391 (1950).
48. See Corwin, Bowing Out 'Clear and Present Danger', 27 No=IE DAm.IE LAw. 325,
349-56 (1952).
49. 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 36 Mn . L. REv. 96.
50. 341 U.S. at 510, quoting from, United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d
Cir. 1950).
51. Corwin, supra note 48, at 358; Gorfinkel and Mack, Dennis o. United States and
the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CAzaw'. L. REv. 475 (1951).
Perhaps the Dennis test, itself, has been modified by the Supreme Court. See Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), 42 Mn,. L. REv. 301.
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ableness" test. The Court's consideration of the importance of the
private rights under the first amendment differs from that under
the fifth. To determine "reasonableness" the court must weigh the
importance of the particular property right which the governmental
regulation impinges, against the effectiveness of the protection af-
forded to the national interest by the challenged regulation. The
first amendment tests, however, are founded on the premise that
every first amendment freedom is of the utmost importance. 2 Thus,
the court need not consider the importance of a particular freedom
under the first amendment test, but will consider only whether regu-
lations impinging those freedoms afford sufficient protection to an
important national interest to overbalance the predetermined, great
importance of free speech. Because this fixed importance of first
amendment freedoms results in more stringent requirements for
abating those freedoms than for fifth amendment rights, the re-
quired effectiveness of the governmental regulations will, in every
case, be greater for the first amendment. Applied to passports, this
means that if passport denial is not an effective enough protection
of national security to be constitutional under the fifth amendment,
it must also be unconstitutional under the first amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Any constitutional considerations, other than the balancing of the
right to travel against the government's interest in national security
as protected by denial of passports on the basis of beliefs and associ-
ations, were beyond the scope of this Note. This eliminated con-
sideration of 1) those cases in which the State Department knows
for a fact that the applicant's purpose is to commit espionage or sab-
otage, 2) denials based on preventing flight from justice, 3) denials
based on noncitizenship, and 4) denials based on indigence.
The specific balance, then, drawn in this Note has led to the fol-
lowing conclusions: Since the right to travel is an important right
within the first and fifth amendments, and since passport denial is
an ineffective method of protecting national security, passport de-
nial based on beliefs and associations is an unconstitutional im-
pingement of the right to travel. A more effective and constitutional
52. At this point the reader might assume that the textual discussion relics on the
"preferred freedoms" doctrine. For a discussion of that doctrine see Mason, The Core
of Free Government, 198&-40: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms," 65 YALE
L.J. 597 (1956). Whether first amendment freedoms enjoy a preferred status among
constitutional rights has been an issue in controversy for some time. Ibid. However, the
statement in the text that every first amendment right is of predetermined great Impor-
tance does not turn on the status of the "preferred freedoms" doctrine. The statement
is based, rather, on the fact that the clear and present danger test, applied in overy free




way of preventing subversive activities by agents residing in the
United States would be criminal prosecution by the proper authori-
ties.53 When there is insufficient proof to convict a "subversive,"
then he should have the freedom to go abroad just as he would have
the freedom to go where he pleases within the borders of the
United States.
53. "There are penal sanctions against he commission or attempt or conspiracy to
commit espionage, sabotag, treason, sedition and subversion." Briehl v. Dulles, 248
F.2d 561, 587 (1957), reed on other grounds sub nora. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 791-98, 2151-56, 2381-90 (1952).

